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Picotte and Alvey: In My View

IN MY VIEW

“NOT SO!” ON AMPHIBS

Sir:
I write to call attention to the misleading and inaccurate statements contained
in the recent article “Aircraft Carriers,” by John F. Lehman, with Steven Wills, in
the Autumn 2021 issue of the Naval War College Review. I refer specifically to the
portions concerning the Bonhomme Richard fire.
I am a retired rear admiral. I commanded three amphibious ships and served
as commander of Amphibious Group 2 from 1992 to 1995. In one of my shipboard tours I served as the commissioning commanding officer of USS Wasp
(LHD 1); Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) was a follow-on member of the same class.
After retirement from the Navy, I led the design team for the LPD-17 program, of
which class USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is the first ship. I also am a 1985 graduate
of our Naval War College.
I took particular issue with the Bonhomme Richard section in the Lehman/
Wills article, including statements such as the following:
The blaze demonstrates the vulnerability of large amphibious ships. . . . [T]hey are
not built to the same survivability standard as are full-size carriers. They have little
armor; . . . they incorporate . . . large, open spaces that include well decks . . . and
large storage parks for vehicles . . . to transport and land Marines. These characteristics add to the overall vulnerability of amphibious ships compared with purpose-built
aircraft carriers.

Ships are built to perform a mission, and design follows function. The LHD
was built to support the amphibious mission. Yes, the ship has a well deck to handle landing craft; vehicle decks to handle Marine Corps equipment such as tanks,
trucks, mobile artillery, and armored personnel carriers; and a large hangar deck
to support aircraft maintenance. It was constructed to be able to support a Marine
amphibious landing, and to do so the ship has to be able to embark the Marines,
store their equipment, and move both quickly ashore by landing craft (from the
well deck) or helicopter (from the flight deck). It must be capable of moving the
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equipment from its place of storage to the point of launch. In contrast, the aircraft carrier is built to support aircraft operations. It cannot carry the volume of
Marine equipment the LHD can, is ill equipped to move such equipment from
hangar bay to flight deck, and cannot support the type of command and control
the Marines require—because that is not the mission the ship was built for!
However, both the CVN and LHD classes are built to the same survivability
standards mandated by BuShips and NavSea. The LHD class design incorporated
all the firefighting-equipment, damage-control, and ship-survivability lessons
learned from the disastrous fires in USS Oriskany (CV 34) and USS Forrestal
(CV 59), both of which were purpose-built carriers. Furthermore, as the first of
a class of new warships, USS Wasp (LHD 1) was required to undergo a full series
of shock trials, as does the first ship of any class of ship design, including aircraft
carriers such as the new USS Gerald Ford (CVN 78), which has yet to deploy
five-plus years after commissioning. I was the commanding officer in Wasp for
its trials, and I can attest that the ship came through with minimal damage and
was mission capable within fifteen minutes of the final detonation.
Owing to our inherent knowledge of the ship class, I and my commissioning executive officer, Captain Keith Larson, and command master chief, Michael Lopez (a master chief damage controlman [DCCM]), were asked to serve
in an unofficial capacity as consultants to the NavSea team that investigated
the Bonhomme Richard fire. From what we observed, the shipboard design
had very little, if anything at all, to do with that fire getting out of control. As
the published public report of the fire established, the ship was lost because
the basic fundamentals of shipboard training in damage control, firefighting,
electrical isolation, tagging out, and flammable storage were not followed.
No ship can survive a major fire if the firefighting equipment is tagged out,
the critical space cannot be isolated because electrical cables and hoses are
running through it without quick disconnects being installed, and flammable
materials are stowed improperly throughout the ship.
Lehman and Wills are wrong in their assumptions that design contributed
to the loss of Bonhomme Richard. The first line of defense on a ship is always a
well-trained, properly manned, and properly equipped crew. The best firefighting
equipment in the world will not help if the crew mishandles or erroneously disables the equipment. Members of the shipboard damage-control and firefighting
team must be prepared to recognize what they are facing and know how to either
correct it or establish a work-around at the scene of the fire, and to accomplish
this quickly—before a fire gets out of control.
Given that Secretary Lehman is a former Navy officer himself, it is hard to believe he does not know this. Perhaps the article represents an attempt to discredit
a class of ships that he long has viewed as a threat to the procurement program
for the large CVN.
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Additionally, I was a bit disappointed that your reviewers did not recognize the
inaccuracies in the article. As an alumnus of the College as well as a member of
the Naval War College Foundation, I would be more than willing to review any
future articles on amphibious-related subjects, and Captain Larson and DCCM
Lopez have agreed to assist as required as well.

LEONARD F. PICOTTE
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)

“NOT SO!” ON CARRIERS

Sir:
I was disappointed in the article “Sizing the Carriers: A Brief History of Alternatives,” by Sam Tangredi, in the Autumn 2021 issue of the Naval War College
Review. The title intrigued me, as the subject touches on a topic very close to my
own research. However, the article relies greatly on sources from the late 1960s
to the early 1980s that reflect little to no original research into the ship classes
discussed. Therefore Dr. Tangredi’s article provides scant new information on
the subject. Being a survey, the article cannot be expected to contribute original
research, but if his survey provides no critical analysis of the extant publications,
what was its purpose? Rather than proving that “the U.S. Navy has sound reasons
for preferring a large-deck aircraft carrier over any smaller variant,” the author’s
survey instead demonstrates how inadequate the level of scholarship is concerning small fleet carriers and light carriers.
Tangredi’s lack of critical attention to the early small carriers is made all the
more apparent by the article’s many factual errors. The simplest is his shorting of
the nine light carriers of the Independence class, which ranged from CVL 22 to
CVL 30 rather than the “twenty-fifth through the thirtieth,” as the author reports.
Tangredi never explicitly names the ships of the Independence class nor those of
the Saipan class, but he states that CVL displacements ranged from sixteen to
nineteen thousand tons. This suggests that his numbering of hulls represents
an even greater error; rather than the eleven hulls built between the two CVL
classes, Tangredi numbers just six. Also forgotten is the poor Princeton (CVL 23),
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which was lost to a single bomb during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. This omission is
particularly odd in that the case could have reinforced the author’s point about
the vulnerability of smaller carriers. Indeed, he could have dwelt on Independence
(CVL 22), which was lucky to be struck by only one air-launched torpedo, and
that outside the most vulnerable portions of its hull. Instead, Princeton is passed
over with the incorrect statement that “all these ships survived the war.”
Regarding Ranger (CV 4), the author makes several additional mistakes. In assessing the opportunity costs of building Ranger at a smaller tonnage than ships
of the Lexington class, he demonstrates the usual inconsistency of evaluating
Ranger’s wartime capabilities using its 1934, as-commissioned characteristics.
Tangredi’s own statement—“which took on a greater significance during World
War II than it bore at the ship’s commissioning” (p. 41)—either impugns Ranger
for defects that had been corrected by the time war broke out or it highlights the
very opportunity costs that he identifies as having no ultimate merit. Poor word
choice makes it hard to discern which he means, but the citation of the faulty
assessment of Ranger contained in James H. and William M. Belote’s Titans of
the Seas as “not equipped to handle a balanced air group” that included torpedo
planes implies that Tangredi does mean to state that the corrected flaws of Ranger
still influence the assessment of its capabilities.
Further muddying the waters, Tangredi flips back and forth between references to the ship’s standard displacement (13,800 tons) and its full-load displacement (18,000 tons) without explaining the disparity in those figures or his
respective purposes in using them. Ranger had been designed for a 13,800-ton
standard displacement, then had been redesigned on the building ways to a
14,500-ton standard displacement. The mismatch between the original 13,800ton designed standard displacement and the 18,000-ton full-load displacement
used in Tangredi’s article gives the erroneous impression that the Navy massively
upsized Ranger when it redesigned it. Instead, the Navy increased the tonnage
only modestly, so as to improve Ranger; allow the building of two larger carriers,
of 20,000-ton standard displacement; and add a second 14,500-ton Ranger-class
vessel, while still remaining within the collective treaty-limited tonnage. This
error comes from a misreading of the passage Tangredi cites from Norman
Friedman’s U.S. Aircraft Carriers discussing the development of 23,000-ton and
27,000-ton standard displacement carrier-design studies.
These mistakes are rooted in a reliance on late 1960s to early 1980s battle
and design histories for a measured analysis of these ships. Tangredi’s use of Dr.
Emily O. Goldman’s political history Sunken Treaties best exemplifies this issue,
because for her naval history assessments Goldman relies on Charles Melhorn’s
Two-Block Fox—a source Tangredi already uses for many of his own points. Melhorn himself relies on a single 1931 letter to prove naval leadership dissatisfaction
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/20
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with Ranger. Tangredi then uses the exact same letter cited in William Trimble’s
Admiral William A. Moffett to support the same point. In both instances the letter
is shorn from its context. The multitude of secondary sources echoing the same
negative assessment might seem to indicate the strength of their argument, but
an analysis of the sources Tangredi cites reveals that these secondary sources use
distressingly few primary sources concerning Ranger and rely entirely too much
on one another. A strong survey of the history of aircraft-carrier sizing would
have identified this flaw and highlighted it for the attention of future researchers;
instead, this survey echoes the unoriginal and uncritical assessment.
The publishing of Tangredi’s article makes it plain that historical examples
continue to have an impact on the carrier-sizing debate. Published in the same
issue was the article “Aircraft Carriers: Missions, Survivability, Size, Cost,
Numbers,” by John F. Lehman, with Steven Wills. Their article argues for the
design and construction of smaller, conventionally powered fleet carriers of approximately the size of the Midway class. It is a shame that my article reevaluating
Ranger was turned down when these articles were going to print. The publication
of my article in a future issue would have continued this important discussion by
addressing issues of fact in Tangredi’s article and providing compelling historical
support to Lehman and Wills.

JAMES ALVEY
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